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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses a puzzle: how to account for changes in the routine behavior of
groups, organizations and individuals in Britain? Following a detailed analysis of state-mar-
ket interdependence and the role of the state in creating the market, an analysis drawn from
the thinking of Weber and Polanyi, we suggest adapting Weber’s notion of bureaucratic rev-
olution: in what we call the British bureaucratic revolution, the state has played an essential
role in social change by creating institutions and rules that are lastingly reorienting actors’
behavior. The example of the healthcare field is examined in order to identify the specific
mechanisms that have been impacting on behavior within an approximately ten-year period;
namely, the introduction of 1) competitive practices (sanction/reward) and 2) auditing and
inspection. If this interpretation is valid, then it is reasonable to assume that the effects of
this bureaucratic revolution extend beyond Britain.
This article is a response to a phenomenon we initially found surprising
and that we have now defined as a puzzle. Having studied change in British
society over the last twenty years, we, like others, have observed a radical
transformation of the behavior of individuals, groups and organizations. How
is it that union leaders steeped in Labour Party traditions have begun
competing with each other more intensively by trying to offer their members
more attractive financial or insurance services? How has it happened that
certain fellow sociologists once known for their strongly leftist positions have
become bold entrepreneurs, heads of universities who invest their financial
R. franç. sociol., 51-1, 2010, 117-143
117
* Our thanks to the organizers of the various research seminars in which this paper was
presented: the Association Française de Science Politique, the Council for European Studies, the
Centre de Recherche et d’Études en Civilisation Britannique (CRECIB), the economic sociology
research group of Sciences Po, Institutions et Dynamiques Historiques de l’Économie (IDHE),
Centre d’Études Européennes de Sciences Po, and SPIRIT Sciences Po Bordeaux. Grateful thanks
also to Jens Beckert, Olivier Borraz, Philippe Bezes, Sophie Duchesne, Renaud Epstein, Erhard
Friedberg, Pierre Lascoumes, Pierre Muller, Carlo Trigilia, Tomaso Vitale, Pierre-Paul Zalio,
Claude Didry and Lavinia Bifulco for their readings and comments.
Freer Markets, More Rules is the title of Steven Vogel’s 1996 book on regulating American busi-
nesses.
D
oc
um
en
t t
él
éc
ha
rg
é 
de
pu
is 
ww
w.
ca
irn
.in
fo
 - 
In
st
itu
t d
'E
tu
de
s 
Po
liti
qu
es
 d
e 
Pa
ris
 - 
  -
 1
93
.5
4.
67
.9
4 
- 0
3/
11
/2
01
4 
17
h1
7.
 ©
 P
re
ss
es
 d
e 
Sc
ie
nc
es
 P
o 
D
ocum
ent téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris -   - 193.54.67.94 - 03/11/2014 17h17. © Presses de Sciences Po 
reserves in the stock market and negotiate buyout/mergers with other univer-
sities? How is it that the university elite as a whole have changed into formi-
dable machines for assessing research performance or auditing university
departments in ways that may well lead to their closure? How did hospital
directors –pillars of the British universal welfare state and the core of a
classic bureaucracy called the National Health Service– come to pay ambu-
lances to drive round the city to reduce emergency-room waiting time the day
they were being inspected in order to improve their efficiency ratings? How
did the robust local British administration –elected officials and civil servants
alike– end up succumbing so completely to what some call “new public
management”; that is, to put it somewhat simplistically, how is it that they
started applying rational choice and classic microeconomics principles to
public management, in some cases through direct transfers of private sector
management formulas?
When the head of the public library in a large, working-class city in the
Midlands –one of the cities that invented Labour Party city management, for
the purpose, among other things, of encouraging workers and their children to
read– told us that his first priority today is making good use of his real estate
holdings and spending efficiently, and that his colleague from a
moderate-sized city like Norwich is grateful to the national lottery for
enabling him to rebuild the burnt-down library, it seemed to us –after our
initial surprise– that we had a puzzle for sociologists.
To put it simply, our puzzle is as follows: how do individuals, groups and
organizations whose behavior used to comply with rules drawn up either by
professional communities or bureaucracies change into competitive individ-
uals and organizations that use entrepreneur discourse and practices, rigor-
ously applying the same norms, practices and sanctions in effect in companies
on competitive markets? How could such a radical, systematic transformation
have occurred, spread, and changed behavior in a mere twenty-five years?
How could what Polanyi called “market society” have been so fully realized
within British public services?
There are many British studies that analyze one or another change in
particular sectors. Our reading of those studies in connection with our own
research has convinced us that a wider scope and more general thinking are
needed to account for the aforementioned changes. The changes we have
observed at the micro-level of individuals and the meso-levels of sectors,
organizations, and regions seem to us systematic and comparable enough to
justify seeking more general causes. In the case of Britain, we have an
obvious suspect (perhaps too obvious): the gradual changes imposed by
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative governments after 1979, implemented first
by her Conservative successor (the Major government) and then, arguably
with greater vigor, by New Labour (Blair governments from 1997 and the
Brown government since 2007).
As we see it, resolving the puzzle requires moving beyond the classic
opposition between regulation by the market and regulation by the state;
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between state and market. Market relations are not necessarily a problem for
hierarchical or power relations; the two types may in fact reinforce each other.
To understand the changes observed in Britain, it seems to us crucial to take a
critical view of this opposition, and to show in fact not only the points on
which state and market complement each other but also and centrally the role
of the state in introducing market mechanisms. In so doing, we hope to help
renew sociological study of contemporary state restructuring. The contempo-
rary state is not withering away or losing its grip at the center or merely
responding to the market pressure of globalization. We seek to show how the
state has in fact strengthened its ability to transform society and steer groups
and organizations by introducing market mechanisms into the heart of the
public sector and by redefining the rules of the game and the parameters of
public action. A detour by way of the classic theoretical works of Marx,
Weber and Polanyi on the state and market and an adaptation of them to the
contemporary situation are crucial to resolving our puzzle.
This article, then, is one in a set of studies we have been conducting on
bureaucracy, governance, public policies, institutions, instruments –in sum,
we examine what is beginning to look like a renewed comparative sociology
of public policy and the state, with the particularity that it is not
state-centered. Not all sociology of the state has disappeared; some has
shifted to the fields of public action, governance, state reform and public
management. Sociological studies in these areas have made it possible to
deconstruct the state, to show how public policy can be a type of collective
action, to see it “in action” (Jobert and Muller, 1987) or “in interaction”
(Hassenteufel, 1997), to call into question the primacy of the state and public
interest. However, while research in the 1980s, responding to studies on the
ungovernability of complex societies and the crisis of the state, was high-
lighting forms of state retreat, decline, erosion, and impotence, some govern-
ments were demonstrating that they were fully capable of implementing
significant reforms –in Great Britain, for example, occasionally at the cost of
violent conflict. These cases called into question the strong-state/weak-state
opposition (Burgi, 1992; Gamble, 1994).
Here we seek to show the strength of institutional change and how the
public sector imitates the private, i.e., how the state initiates and implements a
parallel approach to the one pioneered in the private sector in steering and
governance. These parallels between governance in the private and public
realms are key in explaining the kinds of micro-level changes in conduct with
which we are concerned. We seek to show that Weber’s claims that, on the
one hand, state policies precede the extension of the market and development
of capitalism and, on the other, that the state then imports or imitates the way
large-scale enterprise is organized into its own practices are still fundamen-
tally valid: the state has not disappeared, and nation-states still have consider-
able power resources. Above and beyond their implication in the issues of
maintaining order and defense capabilities, state elites are extraordinarily
active in promoting economic development, restructuring the welfare state
and legislating on ever-more complex problems. Consistent with a suggestion
119
Patrick LE GALÈS, Alan SCOTT
D
oc
um
en
t t
él
éc
ha
rg
é 
de
pu
is 
ww
w.
ca
irn
.in
fo
 - 
In
st
itu
t d
'E
tu
de
s 
Po
liti
qu
es
 d
e 
Pa
ris
 - 
  -
 1
93
.5
4.
67
.9
4 
- 0
3/
11
/2
01
4 
17
h1
7.
 ©
 P
re
ss
es
 d
e 
Sc
ie
nc
es
 P
o 
D
ocum
ent téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris -   - 193.54.67.94 - 03/11/2014 17h17. © Presses de Sciences Po 
made by the Italian sociologist Gianfranco Poggi, our studies belong to a
research approach that aims to identify the types of logic driving the restruc-
turing of European Union states, and to bring to light the dynamics operative
in “a new cycle of the nation-state” (Poggi, 1996). The contemporary “cycle”
of the nation-state in Europe is usually characterized in two ways: a loosening
of state constraints on individuals, organizations, regions (the relative decline
of what Michael Mann [1997] called “hard politics”); nation-states’ adapting
to, resisting against, or actively supporting increasingly global capitalist
dynamics (Jessop, 2002). In contrast to the thesis of the hollow state, this in
no way signifies the decline of the state but rather indicates the directions that
state restructuring is taking. Instead of accepting the understanding that state
and market are opposed, it seems worthwhile to us to reconsider the notion
that they are interdependent, a classic sociology theme for conceiving of how
the social order is formed and how actors’ behavior is rendered predictable.
Having identified the suspect, we can now proceed to the heart of the
matter: the reasons, mechanisms and institutions implicated in bringing about
the observed changes in behavior. A useful way of moving forward here is to
analyze state/market interdependence. Polanyi and Marx exposed the limita-
tions of the free market utopia, stressing, in contrast, the social and political
constructions required for the market to work at all. We therefore hypothesize
that the radical changes in the behavior of actors and organizations in Britain
result from a state-imposed bureaucratic revolution that first profoundly trans-
formed institutions, then behavior.
The present relatively conceptual text aims above all to analyze the role of
the state in changing the behavior of economic and social actors, fairly inde-
pendently of public policy matters. If the previously noted changes have
something to do with Britain’s Conservative governments, then what exactly
did the state and the various governments do to modify behavior –conduct
(conduites), as Foucault would have put it– to such an extent?
We will use Weber’s term “bureaucratic revolution” to account for the
transformation achieved by the British state, and we will examine the case of
hospital services in order to identify the mechanisms by means of which this
bureaucratic revolution has worked to transform individual and group
behavior. In our conclusion we return to the notion of bureaucratic revolution
and the state’s role in regulating society.
Bureaucratic revolution and state/market interdependence:
more market, more state, and so more market
The impact of the radical transformation initiated by Britain’s Conserva-
tive governments has been shown in many studies, many of them focused on
public policies, and by more constructivist analyses, some inspired by the
thinking of Pierre Bourdieu or Michel Foucault (Rose, 1991). Our starting
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point is different. We first sort out quite synthetically some classic texts by
Marx, Polanyi and Weber, seeing where these authors stand on the role of the
state, to explain these changes in behavior. It seems useful to us to return to
the question of the state in the contemporary context of “globalized” capi-
talism. A part of the social sciences is still structured by the notion of an
opposition between state and market, political and market spheres. However,
Weber in his analysis of bureaucracy convincingly shows that bureaucracy,
the state, and the rational, codified rules of modern capitalism developed
alongside each other at the same time: “Viewed social scientifically, the
modern state is an ‘enterprise’ (Betrieb) just as a factory is; indeed, this is
precisely its specific historical characteristic. The relations of domination are
identically determined in the two cases.” (Weber [1918] 1988, p. 321). The
state, in Weber’s account, gradually imported or imitated forms of organiza-
tion initially devised for commercial and industrial activities. Weber points
out the importance of standardization procedures in both spheres: they are
what guarantee predictability of behavior and results. In other words, the
development of the state and the development of capitalism share a funda-
mental feature: reasoning in terms of bureaucratic rule and rational calcula-
tion. This seems to us of striking relevance today: the implementation of
public policies and reforms related (to varying degrees) to what is now called
“new public management” (Ferlie et al., 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000) is
a contemporary illustration of Weber’s understanding that business manage-
ment models were imported into the public sector.
Mobilizing the state in the service of capital?
In classic approaches, state-driven transformation of society is typically
analyzed in neo-Marxist terms. This was very much the case in Great Britain
during the Thatcher years. Marx was the first thinker to have shown that the
self-regulated market, the putatively free and effective play of market forces,
amounts to a utopia. On Marxist and neo-Marxist accounts, the state played
an essential role, namely in connection with primitive accumulation of capital
and with ideology, the latter a reflection of the dominant force in society. This
argument has been applied in various empirical studies; e.g., Logan and
Molotch’s classic 1987 sociological study of urban growth coalitions and how
urban real estate markets operate in the United States, which empirically clar-
ifies the social role of the state in growth coalitions: the state first intervenes
as guarantor of social order, namely through ideology and by regulating the
various social interests (a classic neo-Marxist argument), as social order is an
essential condition for real estate investment; it later intervenes in the accu-
mulation phase, making below-market-price land or subsidies available to real
estate developers.
This type of analysis has been used to explain the changes in British
society. The role of the state in Thatcher’s political program is understood to
have recreated the conditions for profitable accumulation. Such analysis also
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emphasizes ideology and maintenance of social order. Many authors stressed
the shareholder democracy’s use of ideology, the nationalist mobilization
during the Falklands War and the government’s obsession with security.(1)
Other authors focused on maintenance of social order, analyzing how the
courts became implicated in regulating occupational relations, the legislative
limitations imposed on unions, and the confinement of sections of the poor.
On this view, the retreat of the state and the drastic reduction in state interven-
tion, together with privatizations, allowed for the creation of new markets that
were then subsidized by the state; the state put in place the conditions
required for investment and, in some cases, speculation. There was indeed
close cooperation –a growth coalition, to use Logan and Molotch’s term
(1987)– between the financial interests and the main state economic actors for
the purpose of ensuring economic development. The state in this case did not
disappear; indeed it organized that phase, determined its pace, played the role
of regulator to the full, while also subsidizing the accumulation phase.
Do these accounts suffice to piece together our puzzle? Not really. Though
analysis in terms of ideology, beliefs, and interest coalitions does help explain
the mobilization of part of the British population around Thatcher’s
neo-liberal program, it does not explain routine behavior, changes in it, and
the micro-transformations regularly observed in everyday life. All these
dimensions go beyond the strictly political dimension taken into account in
Marxist analysis of the state’s role. The changes we are considering are more
far-reaching: they are properly social changes. Explaining the state’s ability to
change British society, as neo-Marxists did, with reference to Thatcher’s (and
the subsequent) neo-liberal project is important but may not be sufficient.
What is needed is more in-depth analysis of the strength of the social changes
associated with this political project, the mechanisms that were operative, and
a fuller appreciation of the continuing role of the state.
The state creates market society by reorienting the behavior of market actors
Marx brought to light the political and economic wellsprings of market
operation, but it was Polanyi who developed the more thorough critique of the
ideology of the self-regulated market and its effects on industrial societies. In
his famous work of 1944, The Great Transformation, Polanyi emphasizes
much more than Marx had the importance of social and political parameters in
market activities. In addition to his celebrated analysis of the embedded
market, he underlined two features that are essential to understanding what he
called market society in a capitalist system. First, and with much greater
precision than Marx, he stressed the state’s ability to create, manipulate, and
sanction the behavior of actors on the market; that is, to shape and orient
122
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(1) These analyses were developed in the 1980s by thinkers associated with the magazine
Marxism Today who were trying to get out of the Marxist mold by taking into account cultural
studies analyses (Stuart Hall’s, for example) or analyses of post-Fordism.
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behavior by defining the parameters of market activities. Second, he empha-
sized the fact that a market society requires particular social conditions and
behavior, which go beyond property rules or ideology. In order to function,
the self-regulated market has to be organized within a “market society”, and
such societies do not spontaneously emerge but have to be constructed and
developed, namely by the state. For Polanyi, the self-regulated market was an
institutional structure created and planned through state-led intervention. And
he showed how the development of the self-regulated market required
massive, continuous state intervention –interventionism– and control: “Regu-
lation and markets, in effect, grew up together. The self-regulating market
was unknown.” ([1944] 2001, p. 71).
The central question remains: what is market society? How was it created?
Polanyi turned to anthropology to develop his critique of economic liberalism,
purporting to show that homo economicus is the product of market society,
not the other way round.
Following Polanyi, we would insist that a market society cannot be defined
exclusively in terms of the two Marxist components –i.e., a society in which
abilities to resist market mechanisms have been annihilated by constraining
legislation; a society in which a neo-liberal program has become hegemonic
in Gramsci’s sense. As we see it, it also has to be defined as a society in
which the daily behavior of organizations and individuals is oriented and
indeed constrained by –brought into line with– the principles of market
economics. This understanding will allow us to move forward in resolving the
puzzle, as long as we specify a mechanism(2) and a process that make it
possible to “realign” behavior or conduct in this way. These are as follows: 1)
control and destruction of social relations, 2) the creation of market actors by
mechanisms that minimize insecurity and unpredictability.
The first argument is familiar; it is at the heart of Polanyi’s work. He gives
numerous grim examples of how traditional social structures, social solidarity
and institutions were battered and ultimately destroyed by the market. By not
only enabling but actually encouraging actors to behave efficiently as
rational, egoistic actors, market regulations destroy the normative foundations
of institutions and collective action. The state can help create such founda-
tions. It can introduce and maintain a set of rules that constitute the parame-
ters within which market mechanisms can have an impact. Market society is
constructed first of all by institutions that delegitimize other kinds of behavior
and/or make self-regarding rational behavior more efficient and legitimate.(3)
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(2) We use the term mechanism in
Gambetta’s now classic sense, adopted by
Hedström and Swedberg: “I take ‘mechanisms’ to
be hypothetical causal models that make sense of
individual behavior. They have the form, ‘Given
certain conditions K, an agent will do x because
of M with probability p’.” (Gambetta, 1998,
p. 102).
(3) This is the perspective of neo-institutio-
nalists who reject the “methodological indivi-
dualism” shift supported by Brinton and Nee
(1998) and analyze instead the way actors and
interests are partially constructed by institu-
tions (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991).
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Creating structures for rewarding and sanctioning individuals is the second
fundamental point in our argument. These structures work to produce and
reproduce the social order. This brings us back to Weber’s analysis of bureau-
cracy.
A new bureaucratic revolution?
As we see it, the altered behavior of individuals and organizations, in the
British case, can only be understood in terms of the power to transform
society; a power, on Weber’s account, possessed only by bureaucracy. He
used the term “bureaucratic revolution” to characterize the ways in which
individual conduct is changed “from without” by altering the conditions to
which they must adapt. In his analysis, bureaucracy as a revolutionary force
stands opposed to the other great revolutionary force, charisma: “As we have
seen, bureaucratic rationalization can also be a revolutionary force of the first
order vis-à-vis tradition. And it has often been such. But, like every transfor-
mation of the economy, it revolutionizes by technical means, in principle
‘from the outside’ [von außen her]: first facts and rules [Dinge und Ordnung],
then, on that basis, people; the latter by altering the conditions to which they
must adapt [Anspassungsbedingungen] and then perhaps by increasing their
opportunities to adapt [Anpassungsmöglichkeiten] to the outside world by
setting rational ends and means. In contrast, the power of charisma rests upon
belief in revelation and hero worship, on the emotional conviction of the
importance and value of a manifestation of a religious, ethnic, artistic, scien-
tific, political, or whatever sort; in heroism (be it ascetic or military), in the
truth of wisdom, in the magic of grace, or some such. This belief revolution-
izes people ‘from the inside’ [von innen heraus] and seeks facts and rules
according to its own revolutionary will and character.” ([1922] 1972,
pp. 657-658).
Charisma and bureaucracy are indeed two revolutionary forces for social
change, i.e., for the destruction of traditional social systems and the creation
of new systems, with all that this implies of violence and resistance. The two
forces are nonetheless profoundly different. Charisma operates in particular,
contingent contexts, is hard to control, indifferent or hostile to the economy
(Wirtschaftsfremd), and aims to change individuals and their culture “from
within” via the mechanism of conversion. By contrast, the transformative
power of bureaucratic rationalization is perfectly compatible with economic
modernization; it makes behavior more predictable and works to organize the
social order on the basis of calculation, efficiency and rationalization. This is
a force that creates new institutions that then help define actors and their
interests via the mechanism of adaptation.
This brief comparison of Polanyi’s market society and Weber’s bureau-
cratic rule highlights the reward structures that work to produce the social
order. In both these types of social order, stability is ensured by creating
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reward systems that guarantee a certain level of behavioral predictability.(4)
Scott (1996) has suggested differentiating between the two types of social
order by looking at what techniques and instruments are used to ensure action
and action result predictability, and what intermediaries are assigned the task
of oversight. However –and this is our main point here– not only do the decid-
edly different types of logic operative in market and state correspond to
compatible forms of social organization, they are in fact complementary
forms.
Weber’s classic analysis of bureaucratic instruments shows the effects of
“command and control” mechanisms on the behavior of civil servants, who
have to obey their hierarchical superiors.(5) However, Polanyi is more skep-
tical than Weber about the law’s ability to guarantee social stability in market
society. The question of actor obedience and loyalty within a bureaucratic
rule system, independently of control and surveillance mechanisms, is a
classic one in the social sciences.
Bismarck’s famous remark that providing a state-paid retirement pension
was the best way of guaranteeing civil servant loyalty puts us on the track of
incentives, i.e., the rewards available to a bureaucracy. This is what provides
civil servants with stability and predictability, in exchange for which they
supply obedience and loyalty. When loyalty is systematically rewarded, actors
can be commanded and their obedience relied upon. Exaggerating slightly, we
could say that Weber suggests that stability and predictability are two key
mechanisms for securing civil servant loyalty and predictability of the results
of actions taken by those subject to bureaucratic rule. However, Weber is
clearly aware that bureaucrats are ill-adapted to innovation, instability or
leadership. Stability, which is what makes predictability possible, does not
characterize market relations. We do not yet have a means for understanding
how an unstable social order such as the market can produce stability.
In using Weber and Polanyi this way, we seek to draw attention to an
insight of theirs that is occasionally neglected by sociologists; namely, the
properly political –not merely social– construction of the market.(6) It is
important to specify, however, that the two authors were originally interested
in the emergence of the self-regulating market, not changes in state
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(4) Polanyi argues that market societies are
based on individual motives that combine
profit-seeking with fear of want, or, in more
urgent terms, “the profit motive and fear of
starvation”. This is fairly close to Weber’s
analysis of reward structures in the capitalist
system. Regarding fear of starvation, Weber
and Polanyi follow Marx: what led peasants to
accept work contracts was the fact that they had
no means of acquiring the means of production.
Weber went further, drawing up a list of all
occupational categories in the same situation,
including soldiers, civil servants –and scien-
tists. He explained that Russian soldiers in
World War I continued to fight even when they
had had enough because doing so was their
only means of survival. Regarding the “profit
motive”, the Protestant Ethic is quite clear on
how that ethic justifies profit-seeking.
(5) We have deliberately simplified Weber’s
approach here for analytic and heuristic reasons.
Weber’s analysis is, of course, more complex.
(6) For a good example of political
construction of the market, see Lorrain (2005)
on the three models of urban capitalism.
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management as such. Weber does not analyze the market as a utopia in the
way Polanyi does. But though Weber does not develop the idea of embedded
or dis-embedded economic relations, nor does he think of the market as a
spontaneous order, but rather as a relatively recent invention, even an artifice.
In his St. Louis lecture of 1906, he spoke in near-Polanyian tones, distin-
guishing the old economic order from the new in terms of motives and organi-
zation principles: “The old economic order asked: how can I give, on this
piece of land, work and sustenance to the greatest number of men? Capitalism
asks: from this given piece of land, how can I produce as many crops as
possible for the market with as few men as possible?” (Weber [1906] 1948,
p. 367). Regarding peasantry or “rural life”, he concludes the paragraph with
reference to “the thousands of years of the past struggle against the invasion
of the capitalistic spirit” (ibid.).
We are well aware that we are using a different analytic framework from
the one envisaged by these authors. Likewise, for our analysis of contempo-
rary developments, we have borrowed Weber’s analysis of the political
construction of the market and what is for him the crucial point of behavioral
stability and predictability in a legal, rational bureaucracy, which he opposed
to the unforeseeable, discretionary nature of administrations in bygone
periods, which made it more difficult and perilous for private actors to know
what to expect. The creation of a rule of law and a bureaucracy whose
behavior is predictable is therefore essential in Weber’s thinking on the polit-
ical construction of the market.
Our analysis thus shifts somewhat away from Weber’s original in terms of
“bureaucratic revolution”. We have borrowed his category of predictability in
order to show how, in the opposite way, the state can in fact render the
behavior of individual and collective actors predictable by promoting inces-
sant change, destabilizing institutions, and creating a new sanction and reward
system.
Market system actors’ behavior is not usually cast in such terms as obedi-
ence to orders, but rather in those of the pursuit of self-interest. This poses a
problem for market society’s social stability. How can the predictability of
actions and their consequences be ensured when actors are no longer obliged
to be loyal within a stable, predictable environment? Polanyi rightly points
out that pure market society is a mere utopian idea because the market raises
insurmountable problems of social stability that can only be resolved by
recourse to non-market resources and regulations.
From his point we derive the following proposition: market relations do
not necessarily constitute a problem for hierarchical or power relations; the
two types of relations may actually be mutually reinforcing.
The question of controlling and orienting society in ways that go beyond
“command and control” instruments and direct hierarchy-driven interventions
is at the core of contemporary studies of the state, governance, regulation, the
increasing number of dialogue and steering instruments, instruments for
inter-individual and inter-organization consulting (Salamon, 2002; Hood,
126
Revue française de sociologie
D
oc
um
en
t t
él
éc
ha
rg
é 
de
pu
is 
ww
w.
ca
irn
.in
fo
 - 
In
st
itu
t d
'E
tu
de
s 
Po
liti
qu
es
 d
e 
Pa
ris
 - 
  -
 1
93
.5
4.
67
.9
4 
- 0
3/
11
/2
01
4 
17
h1
7.
 ©
 P
re
ss
es
 d
e 
Sc
ie
nc
es
 P
o 
D
ocum
ent téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris -   - 193.54.67.94 - 03/11/2014 17h17. © Presses de Sciences Po 
2007; Hood et al., 1999; Politt and Bouckaert, 2000; Lascoumes and Le
Galès, 2004, 2007). Studying the German situation and the ungovernability of
complex societies, Mayntz (1993, 1999) raised the question of how autono-
mous actors, groups, networks and social subsystems could be coordinated
and steered. In contrast to these studies within the field (or construction site)
of governance, our study starts with radical change in individual and group
behavior at the micro level –behavior that is very much in line with market
society. How does a state succeed in producing this transformation? By what
mechanisms?
In other words it seems important to give priority to the institutional trans-
formations that result from state and bureaucracy commands and their effects
on actors’ behavior and orientations, rather than to beliefs, politics and ideas.
This hypothesis is examined below in the light of an empirical case: the trans-
formation of British health care, the National Health System (NHS).
Competition, discipline, sanction, reward
The changes in actor and organization behavior observed in Britain are
explained, as we see it, by a “bureaucratic revolution” in Weber’s sense,
implemented by governments from 1979 onwards. The state created institu-
tions and introduced regulation by the market, thereby gradually modifying
everyday or routine behavior.
Explaining how the changes that constitute our puzzle became possible and
acceptable is beyond the scope of this article. However, for understanding the
British case, it seems worthwhile to recall the role of the state and the polit-
ical context of the 1970s.
A less interventionist, centralized state governing “at arm’s length”,
weakened by the economic crisis
It is perhaps useful to recall that Great Britain is a multinational kingdom
to which the word “state” cannot be readily applied, as analysts have long
noted. Britons are subjects of the Crown, and the central government is only
one component of the state, itself represented by the monarch. The notions of
common good, general interest, public domain are quite distinct from the
question of the state. There is no body of public law in common-law coun-
tries.(7) The British political system, classically designated the “Westminster
model”, is organized by and around Parliament, and there is no written consti-
tution. Historically, the central government has not played the same role as in
France or Scandinavia. The powerful elites of the business and financial
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(7) This classic affirmation has been rendered irrelevant by the Europeanization of law and the
emergence of quasi-public law in Great Britain.
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world, particularly the City of London, have always been sharply critical of
state intervention. The relatively low level of state intervention is reflected by
the relatively minor historical weight of public spending as a percentage of
GDP, except during the 1930s and after World War II, though long-term
trends are strikingly parallel and relative gaps have not widened over time.
TABLE 1. – Changes in the weight of public spending as a percentage of GDP
Around
1870
Around
1913
Around
1937 1960 1994 2000
United Kingdom 9.4 12.7 30 32.2 42.9 39.2
France 12.6 17 29 34.6 54.9 51.4
Source: World Bank figures, updated for the OECD’s Economic Outlook.
This in turn means that the central government has had a less interven-
tionist role than in France and that market mechanisms and the professions (or
“the club”) have continued to play a more important role in how the country is
governed (Moran, 2003). Comparisons in terms of state traditions, type of
welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and variety of capitalism (Shonfield,
1965; Crouch and Streeck, 1998; Hall and Soskice, 2001) bring to the fore the
British state’s roles of arbitrator, preserver of tradition, and regulator.
But this did not prevent the state from developing highly effective “hands
off” or “arm’s length” governing modes on the basis of a London civil service
elite (Moran, 2003; Burgi, 1992). However, analyses of public administra-
tions have classically criticized not just the small, elitist central administra-
tion but what their authors consider relatively inefficient, dysfunctional local
authorities and services such as the railroad system and the imposing National
Health Service organization.
It is important to bear in mind the depth of the crisis Britain found itself in
the 1970s. Internally and externally, the country was thought of as the sick
man of Europe. The country’s state of economic decline, particularly
pronounced in the industrial sector, was made starkly clear by its 1975 appeal
to the International Monetary Fund during an unprecedented financial crisis
and by the reiterated strikes that culminated in the 1978-79 “winter of discon-
tent”. The issue of decline had haunted political debate among historians
since the late nineteenth century. Moreover, the crisis-struck Britain of the
1970s was profoundly divided: Scotland was mobilized but the referendum
that would have won it a new status was not passed; the UK’s unenthusiastic
entry into the European Community in 1973 had deepened political divisions
inside the political parties; the political and trade union left had become much
more radical, leading to numerous labor conflicts. These divisions produced
strong political instability, as reflected by the surprise victory of Heath’s
traditional Conservatives in 1970, the return of Labour in 1974 in a double
election, the sudden resignation of Prime Minister Wilson, replaced by
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Callaghan in 1976 after a bitter struggle within the Labour Party, and finally
the 1979 elections, where Labour seemed caught in an impasse.
Thatcher’s program did not elicit much enthusiasm, but other solutions had
failed. The calls for a return to a less interventionist and more efficient state
model, for individual and family dynamism in place of labor unions and
public sector bureaucracy, for restoring Britain’s greatness, resonated with the
population. Even in their minority governments the Conservatives had
proposed a way out of the crisis that relied on tried and true models and
myths, such as the superiority of market regulation over a public sector that
was neither strongly legitimate nor efficient. The electoral system gave a clear
majority to the Conservatives: 42% to 45% of the votes. Thatcher won three
consecutive elections, enabling the Conservatives to pursue their program for
eleven years, and John Major, her successor won a fourth. These consecutive
election victories profoundly weakened the opposition.
British governments, particularly the Thatcher governments, used classic
state instruments to impose market discipline on the British economy,
reducing labor union power, privatizing public housing, slashing public
spending. These points are made quite clearly in Gamble’s famous study, The
Free Economy and the Strong State ([1988] 1994). Here we mean to bring to
light other dynamics, which seem to us just as important, and which we have
grouped together under the term “bureaucratic revolution”.
The example we use brings to the fore two mechanisms that seem to
explain medium-term changes, i.e., changes over a ten-year period. In practice
the two mechanisms combine in most sectors, but they are analytically
distinct.
The scope of this article allows for no more than a limited case-study
demonstration. We have chosen a stylized presentation of the change mecha-
nisms implicated in one such case, a presentation that makes them appear
fleshless and suggests they were able to run without contradictions or unin-
tended consequences, without eliciting any resistance. Contradictions, unin-
tended consequences and resistance are of course very important, but they are
not the focus of this article. We do mention them in the conclusion, however.
Creating an internal market: competition and a new system of rewards and
sanctions for creating rational, selfish, competitive entrepreneurs and
individuals
For Thatcher’s Conservatives, the public sector was the cause of Britain’s
many ills, and their first priority was to transform and reduce the weight of
this sector while lowering taxes.
From 1979, then, it became a relatively systematic strategy of British
governments to create internal markets or quasi-markets for producing and
supplying services within the public sector, thereby transforming or, in New
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Labour language, “modernizing” various sectors.(8) The method was fairly
simple; it involved organizing provision of public goods and services on the
basis of market principles –i.e., competition and trade based essentially on
prices and contracts– and establishing a clear “purchaser/provider split”.
Making a profit became the structuring principle for organizing goods and
services supply and the workforce. To attain this goal, Britain’s massive
vertical, hierarchical bureaucracies were replaced by a set of smaller, rela-
tively autonomous “agencies”, less tightly controlled by “command and
control” instruments. Each agency was responsible for keeping within its
annually fixed budget. The agencies’ relative autonomy allowed for managing
human resources in ways that did not comply with the civil service rules in
effect or acknowledge the weight of labor unions. A segment of agency
director and staff salaries could vary as a function of agency performance
–namely financial performance.
Each agency bought and sold services to others, sometimes within the same
organization, ministry, or hospital. Agency goals depend of course on agency
area of intervention, but all had to comply with the fundamental public
management doctrine first formalized by the Thatcher government as “value
for money”. The term is inspired by audit practice (Saint-Martin, 2000) and
includes three principles: 1) obtaining public policy inputs at the lowest
possible cost; 2) getting the best possible performance for the given input
level; 3) being as efficient as possible in attaining the stated goals.
Many agencies were not granted a monopoly over the given task or func-
tion; either their geographical perimeter was enlarged or their functions were
diversified. In other words, agencies often found themselves competing with
other organizations.
Marxist authors were already analyzing the effects of competition on orga-
nization and individual discipline (Harvey, 1989). Harvey stressed the regula-
tion mode implied by competition –i.e., externally imposed discipline– and
the sanctions threatening anyone who did not play the game. Competition was
codified by the agencies themselves, the government, in some instances the
media; all helped in developing rankings and performance indicators that
would work to make the logic of competition seem natural and desirable. This
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(8) The notion of quasi-market designates
aspects of public service supply that cannot be
or have not been privatized but are nonetheless
organized according to market principles, speci-
fically, competition among production units or
service providers. The internal market of
Britain’s National Health Service is an oft-cited
example of a quasi-market. Patients can only
gain access to hospitals through their general
practitioner (GP); the National Health Service
allocates an annual budget sum to GPs for
“purchasing” operations from hospitals that
provide what they [the GPs] consider good
quality for the price (quality/price ratio). The
government hoped physicians would get
hospitals to compete with each other, which
would improve the service provided by
hospitals; i.e., the quality and price of opera-
tions. Paul du Gay (2004, p. 46) describes
quasi-markets as a form of hands-off governing:
“What we have here, then, is neither traditional
Weberian bureaucracy nor a free market but a
governmentally constituted quasi-market. It is
the formation of opportunity structures and
environmental parameters rather than routine
daily decisions that is the object of organiza-
tional manipulation.”
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is turn allowed the government to refuse to allocate resources to other areas,
to reduce such resources, and to remove other questions from the policy
agenda. Competing successfully gradually imposed itself as a principle for
legitimating public action. And it became naturalized as an ineluctable
constraint.
The national healthcare system had been a source of pride for Britons after
the Second World War. Gradually, however, and despite the fact that this
cannot be proved irrefutably, it had come to be thought of as one of the most
poorly performing in Europe in terms of care quality and costs. Consequently,
after the principle of decentralized agency management had been extended to
most British public service sectors, the National Health Service too was
forced to undergo fundamental transformation. This only began in 1988, after
the third election victory of Thatcher’s Conservative Party, and it ran up
against deep resistance. The principles of the reform were laid out in a White
Paper entitled Working for Patients (1989). The reason the Thatcher govern-
ment waited almost ten years before creating an internal market in the NHS
was that it needed indisputable political legitimacy to impose this reform on
Britain’s highly structured, independent medical professions. However, when
New Labour came to power in 1997, it adapted and strengthened the frame-
work that its Conservative predecessors had developed for the NHS, as is
clearly shown by the Labour government’s own 1997 White Paper, The New
National Health Service: Modern, Dependable. New Labour has since
reformed the internal National Health Service quasi-market, regulated it
differently rather than abolishing it. The major difference lies in the heavy
budget increases that Labour governments have allocated to the service.
Market or quasi-market mechanisms were only gradually introduced into the
health system. The first move was to withdraw some hospitals from Regional
Health Authority control. This was done by creating “trusts”, foundations with
their own budgets, authorized to compete with private hospitals. Trust hospitals
therefore became de facto independent agencies, “providers” of services to
doctors on the one hand, the Health Authority on the other. Conversely, family
doctors, general practitioners and Health Authorities became hospital service
“purchasers”. To guarantee annual funding for hospitals and their various units,
the Health Authorities negotiated annual renewable contracts with them. These
contracts had to be won through competitive tender. The aim was twofold: first,
to make hospitals more sensitive to the demands and goals of the authorities
that were funding them; i.e., the central government and its agencies, and to
their customers (the general practitioners sending them patients); second, to
improve hospital effectiveness and efficiency. The NHS was known for its
extremely long waiting times. The new system was first applied to some hospi-
tals only and a certain segment of physicians. Annual adjustments were made
before the system was generalized to the entire Service.
What were the micro effects of this state-driven transformation of the state’s
own bureaucracy? Individuals in the agencies first had to cope with a shake-up
of the familiar punishment and reward system. Creating multiple agencies and
introducing market mechanisms had a profoundly destabilizing effect on
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individuals and organizations that were accustomed to hierarchical relations
and relatively predictable career advancement. In the decentralized agency
system, individuals –particularly department heads– could be rewarded in three
ways: promoted faster than before, within an agency or between agencies; paid
salaries that were no longer determined by the civil service grid or any other
standardized professional grid but depended solely on performance; granted
strong independence to implement goal-reaching policies. As long as directors
abided by the iron law of “value for money”, they were relatively free to
proceed, and in any case were no longer constrained by heavily codified proce-
dures. The sanction system was also changed: employment security was no
longer guaranteed; agencies could be closed down and their workers left
jobless; salary levels could be cut; less skilled employees lost bargaining
power.
Consider the example of a surgical unit organized as a cost center. Budget
concerns are at the core of the organization. A hospital unit can no longer just
wait for patients. Every year it negotiates with physicians to determine the price
of a given number of a given type of operations. If one hospital can provide the
physician with appendix operations at a better price than another for equal
quality, it is in the physician’s interest to purchase such operation packages at the
lower price because his/her income depends on ability to negotiate the best price
possible, all things being equal. A hospital unit that is managing costs will hire
surgeons, nurses and other staff in connection with a set activity forecast. It buys
services from its hospital, other NHS agencies or private companies. The perfor-
mance of each hospital unit is carefully measured by a battery of quality and cost
indicators. Quality can be measured in various ways: consultants choose indica-
tors from among those used in international comparisons; professional associa-
tions or national institutes discuss how to translate the notion of quality into
indicators (this can vary from one field to another); patient representatives are
allowed to contribute their opinions. If a heart surgery unit cannot provide quality
service at a competitive price (classic quality indicators are patient survival rate
and length of post-operation life, and percentage of complications requiring
renewed hospitalization), then doctors will no longer purchase operations from it,
customers will no longer be sent for treatment in it, and the unit may well close.
Conversely, a high-performance unit can attract and pay the best surgeons,
purchase modern equipment, increase its productivity. Finally, the rules of the
game in these National Health Service internal quasi-markets change every year
in accordance with policy priorities, budget allocations and performance goals.
In practice, hospital units were at first extremely destabilized. Individuals
lost their bearings. The practice of using indicators and the process of learning
new game rules were experienced as traumatic by the different groups. Labor
unions and physicians were strongly opposed to the changes, in the name of
professional ethics, and this provoked considerable conflict and tension.(9) It
took considerably more than a year to get the new system in place. However,
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(9) We have not studied these resistances and tensions, which have been regularly voiced at
length in British daily papers and deserve systematic analysis.
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some unit and hospital directors were delighted to escape the previous system
of constraints. The best-known, most highly performing and enterprising
among them had regularly complained of NHS constraints and bureaucracy.
The new game rules gave them the opportunity to reorganize their units, criti-
cize certain professional practices, push aside colleagues reputed to be poor
physicians or surgeons –but also rivals, use classic management formulas to put
pressure on hospital staff. Agency directors found themselves facing a
well-known dilemma: should they resist implementing the new rules, adapt to
them unflinchingly, or –the path chosen by most– accept some of the new rules,
reject others, and practice constraint avoidance behavior? At the outset, the
agency system created enormous chaos. Gradually, the rules of the game were
specified and criteria and norms developed; new points of reference were insti-
tutionalized. The change –i.e., adopting market mechanisms to healthcare and
hospital management– was gradual. Sanctions played a significant role in disci-
plining employees. In three years of experimentation, the closing first of
hospital units, then of entire hospitals, illustrated the very real risks incurred by
individuals who did not abide by the new rules. A unit that refused to apply the
new accounting system and budget rules lost its funding and was in danger of
being closed. Agency funding and budget regulations thus made it possible to
format –render predictable– individuals’ problems and their approaches to
acting within hospital units.
Employees had to show they could perform well within this system, that
they knew how to take advantage of their new independence from procedure,
take initiatives, initiate reorganization moves, negotiate contracts, capture
market share, innovate. The former reward of employment stability was
replaced with greater organizational autonomy and greater independence in
implementing programs.
Agency-driven reorganization had the effect of differentiating between “the
quick and the dead”; i.e., those who could adapt quickly, react, seize opportuni-
ties, and those who were merely waiting and were therefore doomed to disap-
pear. Individuals’ accelerated lives in these agencies were more interesting and
exciting; they had more autonomy and strategic capabilities, and they could
obtain substantial rewards. Even quick, innovative individuals could of course
one day find themselves moving against the current of their agency and be
forced to leave, but in the short term the agencies profited from individuals’ full
commitment, energy, ability to innovate. As explained by classic economic
theory, it is in the agencies’ interest to have motivated, highly performing indi-
viduals working for them. These smart individuals would one day also disap-
pear, of course –therein lies the power of market mechanisms. Within the new
competitive agencies, individuals enjoy greater room for maneuver and
autonomy, but they remain an adjustment variable, and however bright and
quick they may be, they are still the ones to pay for individual and collective
failures.
The market’s power to orient individual behavior is based not on hierarchy
and obtaining obedience but on the system’s ability to give individuals
autonomy –we might almost say its ability to emancipate them from earlier
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bureaucracies. This makes their behavior more, rather than less, predictable.
Creating agencies and getting them to compete with each other –namely for
scarce central-government resources– worked to depoliticize some of the issues
related to redistribution. In the end, the effects of this process appear the result
of the dynamism and performance of autonomous individuals and organizations
acting within quasi-markets. How far we have come from public debate!
In more analytic terms, contrary to producing an exchange of loyalty for
stability, market mechanisms create an unstable, destabilizing environment that
weakens individuals, who start fearing for their careers and jobs. The power of
hierarchical superiors, the central government, state elites is maintained by
creating incentives and sanctions aimed at making individual behavior predict-
able. In the case of the National Health Service and its hospitals, unit directors,
doctors and in some cases even nurses gradually adapted their behavior in
fundamental ways for the purpose of maximizing their unit’s effectiveness and
efficiency score. Maximizing profits and the interests of individuals and the
organization became the central concern of hospital units. And it was not the
invisible hand of the market but the visible hand of the state that distributed
punishments and rewards, with the aim of bringing into being a rational,
egoistic, utility-maximizing individual, even when that individual was a doctor
or nurse. The reiterated application of such incentives and sanctions year after
year (facilitated by the Conservative Party’s four consecutive election victories)
and the evolution of those incentives and sanctions (New Labour adopted very
similar principles) worked to naturalize such operation modes, to sweep away
the old, de-legitimated system, and to preclude any alternative ones from
making real headway. Once New Labour had adopted the Conservative frame-
work, the predominant feeling was that there would be no turning back. Indi-
viduals working in hospitals, namely the people in charge of those hospitals and
their units, gradually became entrepreneurs evaluated by means of criteria
established by the central government and relayed by the agencies themselves
–almost independently of all other considerations.
Auditing, inspecting, ranking and sanctioning: exerting constant pressure in
order to reorient individual and organization behavior
The strength of the British bureaucratic revolution is that it has activated
mechanisms whose effects have come to be felt with even greater force in the
medium- to long-term. This applies in particular to the mechanisms engen-
dered by systematic use of public policy instruments such as audits and rank-
ings (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2004). In other words, by setting up auditing
procedures of the sort developed and applied in the private sector, the central
government transformed the rules of the public policy game.
Two trends have developed in British public management: 1) public sector
regulation has become an enormous undertaking, even greater than private
sector regulation; 2) government regulation of the public sector has become
much more complex, precise and specialized. Control capacity of this
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magnitude had to be constructed from scratch. Historically, the health profes-
sions were overseen and regulated in Great Britain by professional inspection
regimes and bodies created in the nineteenth century. The primary goal of
inspection was to check compliance with professional norms and standards in
a consensual framework for improving hospital services. Most inspectors
were former hospital unit heads themselves (comparable in this respect to
France’s National Education inspectors). This classic government approach to
regulation (Hood et al., 1999; Baldwin and Cave, 1999) was drastically
changed by the arrival of a new instrument –“league tables” (see below)– and
the introduction of auditing procedures.
To reform British public administration, the Thatcher government turned to
the ideas of neo-liberal economists and management models used in the
private sector. For the Prime Minister herself it was obvious that private
sector business management should be the reference for reforming all public
sectors, including healthcare. Introducing mechanisms that would exert pres-
sure on healthcare costs was a government priority; however, it was also a
delicate matter given public support for the National Health Service. As early
as 1979-80, new programs and organizations began appearing as part of the
offices of the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer; namely, the
Efficiency Unit and the Scrutiny Programme, part of the Exchequer’s Finan-
cial Management Initiative. In 1983 a major innovation was introduced that
went relatively unnoticed at the time: the National Audit Office, designed to
audit the public sector.(10) It was on this occasion that the new iron law of
British public management was formulated: “value for money”.(11) All
spending and all programs were to be judged on the sole criterion of the
cost/efficiency ratio. This required developing indicators, performance
measures, means of inducing competition and assessing competitiveness.
How were these indicators, these knowledge acquisition instruments, to be
produced? The transformation began when the Thatcher government created
the National Audit Office (this was later split in two; we are interested in what
became the Audit Commission). The National Audit Office was developed
independently of and indeed counter to the aforementioned professional
inspection regimes. The aim was to produce management indicators based on
the presumably neutral criteria of good business management and inde-
pendent of local context; then to compare organizations so as to encourage the
spread of “good practices” and sanction bad ones. This amounted to a system
of continuous pressure to achieve management efficiency as determined by
performance indicators. The measurement system itself was created not on the
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(10) Power’s analytic study (1997) and the
major studies conducted by Christopher Hood
and his team have shown the dynamics and
effects of using audit and inspection in Britain.
With the proliferation of government agencies,
new instruments were developed to produce
coherence and orient behavior as a function of
public policy priorities. Inspectors, auditors,
public market regulatory codes proliferated; a
“competition office” was created, etc.
(11) In Building the New Managerialist
State (2000), Denis Saint-Martin shows how
this formula originated in direct contacts
between Thatcher and representatives of the
Management Consultancies Association.
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basis of professional association recommendations but the model furnished by
the prestigious Chartered Institute for Public Finance and Accounting, the
central institution of Britain’s business auditing and inspection system.
Consequently, the management and performance indicators that were
developed and how they were applied and checked had to comply with the
four auditing principles (Hood et al., 1999):
– auditor independence from audited organization, auditor professionalism
(the opposite of peer review models);
– fixing apolitical, non-local goals, standards and measurable results; i.e., the
same criteria have to be applicable in different contexts;
– emphasis on procedure and process standardization, i.e., regardless of
particular situations or policy goals;
– systematic case comparison using precise performance indicators and
measurements.
This was a rigid, robust, and indeed hyper-rationalist iron cage (Le Galès,
2004). The Audit Office checked figures; it worked to create standards and
measures. The beauty of the mechanism was the clear view of public manage-
ment it afforded central government. Agency performance could now be
measured by the “value for money” yardstick. The advance of computer tech-
nology in the 1980s made it possible to generalize the “reporting” process;
i.e., activity reporting designed to account for actions taken and measure
distances from set goals –but also gaps between the given hospital and
high-performance ones. Healthcare managers had to comply with this new
system of constraints, which at first involved measuring costs, producing the
indicators demanded by the government, reorganizing hospital units and
re-hauling the accounting system. Hood et al. (1999) claim that these control
processes marked a return to the Benthamite utilitarian tradition. Bentham (as
Polanyi too had noted) and his disciple Chadwick championed strict central
inspection (Hood et al., 1999), consistent with Bentham’s saying: “The more
strictly we are watched, the better we behave.”
Hospital indicators
In 2000, the Labour government revised the indicators, in part to show that
its management approach was different from the Conservatives’. In a strategy
document entitled NHS Plan: A Plan for Investment, a Plan for Reform, it
drew up a detailed set of indicators and management goals. The former
include such points as emergency room waiting time, waiting time (in weeks)
for an appointment with a specialist, waiting time for an operation. Specific,
detailed goals were set for hospital and hospital unit directors, physicians and
nurses. These include a hospital ranking system; rankings are published every
year. The government created the National Institute for Clinical Excellence
(NICE) to measure the costs and effects of established and new treatments, an
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essential instrument for rationalizing healthcare provision. Lastly, on the
Audit Commission model, the Labour government created a specialized over-
sight group, the Commission for Health Improvement, in charge of producing
indicators, measuring performances and auditing hospitals.
Ranking systems –the system used in the NHS is called “league tables”–
constitute a classic new public management instrument for getting organiza-
tions to change. Competition, the race to meet preset quantitative goals, and
the use of a reward and punishment system often induce actors to move in the
direction desired by the given system’s promoters. The first biennial British
hospital ranking was published in 2001 by the Health Ministry.
All hospitals (public hospitals and foundations; 170 were included in the
first ranking) were ranked in three categories –no star, one star, two or three
stars– on the basis of the following criteria, all in the form of performance
indicators.
Hospitals are graded on a scale of one to five along twenty criteria,
including the following:
– emergency-room waiting times;
– number of patients not receiving an operation within 29 days of the cancel-
lation of a scheduled operation;
– hospital cleanliness score;
– waiting time for an in-hospital consultation;
– number of patients waiting over two weeks for an appointment with a
cancer specialist after their GP has detected a risk and requested an exami-
nation;
– rate of patient deaths in the 30 days following an operation (per 100,000
operations);
– rate of patient deaths in the 30 days following a cardiac operation (per
100,000 operations);
– number of emergency readmissions after release from the hospital;
– improvement score for eliminating cases of infections contracted in
hospital;
– criterion for eliminating mixed-sex hospital rooms;
– patient satisfaction score;
– rate of patients whose transfer to another hospital for medical reasons was
delayed;
– staff absentee rates (%).
Moreover:
– each hospital is ranked in one of the three categories; three-star hospitals are
rewarded with additional funding while no-star hospitals are sanctioned
financially and must submit to tighter controls;
– all indicators for each hospital are compared to national averages;
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– the evaluation sheet for each criterion specifies whether the hospital has
reached its own goals or not;
– the positive or negative difference from the national average is measured.
In 2001, thirty-five hospitals were awarded three stars; twelve got no star.
The latter group was immediately put under the control of the newly created
NHS Modernisation Agency, charged with reorganizing hospitals to improve
efficiency and overall management. The sanction for individuals was thus
very real. The ranking attracted media attention to the Epsom and St. Helier
NHS Trust, identified at the time as the worst trust in Britain; the media were
also there to deplore the poor rank of the prestigious Oxford Radcliffe
Hospital Trust. Conversely, the performances of the highest ranked hospitals
were put forward as management “benchmarks” that other hospitals could
then be compared to. “Three-star” hospital managers obtained two substantive
rewards for the following year: greater management autonomy; higher
funding and other capabilities for developing their activities. “Two-star”
hospital managers also got more resources but no greater management
autonomy.
The publicity given to the indicators greatly helped institutionalize “good”
management criteria. At first, some hospital directors said they would not take
into account rankings that had been established by a small group of senior
civil servants and consultants. The association of hospital directors lodged an
official protest immediately after the first ranking was published, claiming
that the criteria were arbitrary and obscure and the methods for measuring and
overseeing performance questionable since hospitals were complex organiza-
tions. However, the results announced did elicit reaction, and the conclusions
proved hard to ignore. The “winners” greatly helped legitimate the instru-
ment: hospital heads were delighted and rewarded their management teams.
Moreover, their prestige in the professional associations was greatly
enhanced. Some hospital unit heads got hired by other hospitals to bring up
poor scores or weak ratings; in some cases they received substantial salary
raises. Others were called to even more prestigious offices in the National
Health Service or the government itself. On the sanction side, getting a low
rating meant undergoing increasingly heavy pressure; hospital units and ulti-
mately entire hospitals were gradually closed down. Health Minister Alan
Milburn officially invited directors whose hospitals were performing poorly
to leave if they could not significantly improve performance in the following
year.
The rank-related sanction system was put in place only after approximately
ten years of Conservative reform. The systematic reiteration of ranking
processes naturalized the instruments and gradually legitimated hospital
closures, though they have always been contested at the local level. Poor
scores on care quality indicators were powerful legitimation instruments:
closures were justified not in terms of cost but always in connection with
protecting patients and further improving the performance of the major hospi-
tals that were already getting all the resources.
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The sanction system was put in place very slowly. Under the Thatcher
governments it became conceivable to close hospitals. Later, single hospital
units began to be closed. Under New Labour governments (after 1997), fifteen
hospitals have been closed. Following a period of state investment, the
Labour government went back to stressing the importance of sticking to a
budget. The massive deficits of many hospitals led to new closures and
closure threats. At the time of writing (2005), the government was contem-
plating closing 60 hospitals located throughout the country and concentrating
resources and advanced technologies on a few immense flagship hospitals.
The audit and inspection approach has gradually led to greater standardiza-
tion; the strictly managerial dimension has come to dominate the more polit-
ical aspect of management (Miller, 2005). This puts strong pressure on staff.
Strategic priorities, local population needs, political choices have been set
aside; emphasis is now on meeting and surpassing performance levels in any
way possible and competing to get good marks for the units of the given
hospital. Doing so now amounts to political and professional success.
“Winning” hospitals are slowly acquiring the promised financial independ-
ence and proudly displaying to envious colleagues the innovations made
possible thereby. All such developments and information are relayed by the
professional press and professional associations, conferences and colloquia.
*
* *
We have used Weber’s notion of bureaucratic revolution to explain
changes in the behavior of individual and collective actors in Britain; i.e., to
account both for processes that worked to destroy existing social relations and
the new framework developed for punishing and rewarding actors. Following
Weber and Polanyi, we have tried to show how political power is used to
import market mechanisms: politics and the market are therefore complemen-
tary. In order to discipline actors, reward them, and make them accept a new
institutional environment, almost a new work ethic, there has to be a central-
ized state, one that controls all resources for a relatively long period (thereby
diminishing the credibility of alternatives and the likelihood that protest will
succeed). In sum, we are tempted to say, there has to be a strong state. We
have identified the instruments that the British central government used to
introduce market mechanisms such as compulsory competitive tender into
hospitals and to transform hospital units by evaluating them in terms of
central-government-defined indicators. We have also stressed medium-term
dynamics that gradually change behavior and make it more predictable –this
last point is central to our analysis. A central government that can modify
goals and indicators will greatly increase its steering capacity. Bringing about
change by acting on norms and indicators –i.e., practicing institutionalist-type
change– will, as we see it, have cumulative medium-term effects, a strong
factor in social and political change. The bureaucratic revolution initiated by
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives was pursued despite the changeover of
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political power; the substance of that revolution has been adopted and pursued
by New Labour.
We have not mentioned thus far the limits of these changes. Contrary to the
claims of some management gurus, a change based on organizational and
institutional change does not necessarily change individuals “inside”; it does
not necessarily alter what Weber called their “Gesinnung” –basic orientation;
it does not necessarily change their values or cultures. This means that though
we have brought to light medium-term dynamics that produce fairly system-
atic changes in behavior, those transformations are of course not univocal and
do not automatically lead to changes in individuals’ values or beliefs. In some
sectors, people did organize opposition to the changes. In other cases, individ-
uals adapted to the new framework without changing their values or beliefs.
Still others strongly resisted the reforms at the micro level.(12) Lastly, the
unplanned, unsought effects of these changes have been systematically
brought to light in Britain, leading New Labour leaders to change their indi-
cator system once again.
In some respects, our interpretation here –the triumph of “the managerial
spirit” as analyzed by Ogien (1995)– may seem fairly ordinary. But in this
case the managerial spirit was serving a political project for restructuring the
state in such a way as to align it with global capitalism. This suggests that it
would be worthwhile bringing together studies in the sociology of manage-
ment, management formulas, and resistance to management and management
formulas in public and private organizations more systematically with studies
on the dynamics of transmitting and resisting against practices, either at the
specific level of mechanisms, as Segrestin has done (2004), or in the more
uncertain quest for a “new spirit” of public organizations, in line with
Boltanski and Chiapello (2006).
To conclude, let us point out a paradox of contemporary studies of the
state: the contradiction between the observation that societies have become
ungovernable and the observation that the state still controls the means of
coercion. Authors working in the areas of multi-level public policy, regulation
and governance have provided evidence that state centrality is being eroded,
questioned, lost. Political science and sociology studies of public policy and
later of public action have made it possible to deconstruct the category
“state”, to free ourselves of its weight so as to be able to analyze how things
really operate, the real dynamics of institutionalization, government and
governance, and moves to reform the state. Studies of public policy empha-
size, for example, the illusory unity of the state, the way different loci of
power are in fact interpenetrated and power itself fragmented, the
non-methodical nature of the dynamics shaping European Union governance,
multiple interactions among groups and organizations, state failure. They
offer little evidence of the state’s ability to radically change behavior. In
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(12) On unexpected effects of these processes and ways of using them toward ends other than
the intended ones, see the long-term Public Services research program of the Economics and
Science Research Council: http://www.publicservices.ac.uk/category/research/.
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contrast, some critical sociology studies stress the triumph of neo-liberalism
and state-imposed discipline –indeed, some of our arguments here are consis-
tent with this. However, to be complete, we would have to examine in detail
the impasses and failures of such programs as well as means of resisting
against them.
These contradictory views on the re-composition of the state suggest the
relevance of developing a sociology of the state that would be more in tune
with “the new phase of the state” identified by Poggi (1996), a sociology that
would partially correspond to regulation analysis (Hood, Rothstein and
Baldwin, 2001). Hood and his colleagues have suggested that the state now
acts more by applying rules and determining standards and parameters for
public action than by actually intervening. Britain is a laboratory for changes
of this sort.
Finally, if our interpretation in terms of “bureaucratic revolution” is
correct, then diffusion and imitation mechanisms should be able to be identi-
fied far beyond Britain. As we see it, the changes currently underway in
French public management –public management of research, healthcare and
decentralization, for example– deserve to be analyzed in these terms.
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